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Note 
MAKING WAL-MART PRETTY:  
TRADEMARKS AND AESTHETIC 
RESTRICTIONS ON BIG-BOX RETAILERS  
AKILA SANKAR MCCONNELL 
INTRODUCTION 
When Wal-Mart opened a retail store in Evergreen, Colorado, 
local officials “forced” Wal-Mart to include “an oak portico over 
stone pillars at its main entrance, forest green accents, and parking lot 
medians with evergreen trees.”1 Home Depot designed a store in 
Kitty Hawk, North Carolina to look like an early twentieth-century 
coast guard lifesaving station with “covered porch-like areas out 
front, two small towers jutting from the roof and Victorian-style 
details, such as rounded dormer windows and gingerbread trim.”2 
Because the city of San Francisco did not want a Best Buy exterior to 
be made of painted cement, the store changed the entire exterior to 
stucco.3 In Framingham, Massachusetts, a planning board has 
required retailers to “substitute New England-style stores and soft 
pastels for box-like buildings and garish colors.”4 
These cities’ restrictions represent a new wave of measures to 
control big-box retail facilities. Big-box retail facilities are large, 
industrial style buildings that range from twenty thousand to over two 
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Move Beyond Big-Box Format, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 2004, at D9. 
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hundred thousand square feet.5 They usually “resemble big boxes 
with wide entrances, high ceilings (and a staggering array of 
merchandise stacked almost to the ceiling), stark interior, warehouse-
like appearances, surrounded by acres of concrete parking areas.”6 
Many cities have welcomed the entrance of big-box retailers because 
these stores produce significant revenue and are convenient for 
consumers.7 However, in response to the fear that these retailers 
destroy small-town America, some cities have used a number of 
methods to prevent big-box stores from coming into communities,8 
and to prevent big-box stores from leaving empty concrete buildings 
behind.9 Recently, communities have responded to the fear that these 
 
 5. MD. DEP’T OF PLANNING, MANAGING MARYLAND’S GROWTH: MODELS AND 
GUIDELINES, “BIG-BOX” RETAIL DEVELOPMENT 3 (Oct. 2001), available at 
http://www.mdp.state.md.us/mgs/bigbox _v3.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal); N.J. 
OFFICE OF STATE PLANNING, OSPLANNING MEMO: BIG BOX RETAIL 1 (Dec. 1995), at 
http://www.nj.gov/dca/osg/docs/bigboxretail120195.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2004) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal). Big-box retail facilities include: (1) discount department stores, which 
offer a wide variety of merchandise (e.g., Wal-Mart and Kmart); (2) category killers, which offer 
a large selection of merchandise at low prices in a particular category (e.g., Home Depot and 
Toys ‘R’ Us); (3) outlet stores, which provide discount shopping for major department stores 
(e.g., Nike Outlets, J.C. Penney Outlet); and (4) warehouse clubs, which offer a variety of goods 
in bulk at wholesale prices (e.g., Costco Wholesale and Sam’s Club). Id. at 1–3. A newer 
expansion of the big-box concept is the power center which may include both a discount 
department store and a supermarket within one store. See generally Raymond G. Truitt, Fe Fi 
Fo Fum: Retail Giants Rule Power Centers, PROB. & PROP., Apr. 10, 1996, at 38. 
 6. Stanley D. Abrams, The Big Box Store: Regulating and Controlling Godzilla, ALI-
ABA Course of Study: Land Use Institutes Planning, Regulation, Litigation, Eminent Domain, 
and Compensation 1103, 1105 (1995). 
 7. See infra notes 13–23 and accompanying text. 
 8. See, e.g., In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Town of N. Elba, 238 A.D.2d 93 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1998) (holding that North Elba could refuse to grant Wal-Mart a conditional use permit 
and site approval because of the negative aesthetic effects in this tourist city); In re Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 702 A.2d 397 (Vt. 1997) (holding that, under Vermont’s Act 250, the town of St. 
Albans could refuse to allow Wal-Mart to build a store near the highway on the outskirts of the 
town); Abrams, supra note 6 (discussing the use of zoning ordinance amendments and public 
facilities controls to restrict the size and placement of stores); Constance Beaumont & Leslie 
Tucker, Big-Box Sprawl (And How to Control It), MUN. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 5, at 
http://www.nationaltrust.org/issues/smartgrowth/big_box_sprawl.pdf (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (discussing how design standards, retail size limits, planning moratorium, 
intergovernmental agreements, and withdrawal of subsidies for big-box retailers can prevent 
retailers from entering the city). 
 9. See, e.g., Benjamin Forgey, Lofty Ideas Transform Retail Space Into a Workplace, 
WASH. POST, June 16, 2001, at C1 (describing a company that converted an abandoned Caldor 
store into an innovative, loft-like office building); Evan Halper, Empty Stores Are a Hard Sell: 
Retail Behemoths Leave Behind Acres of Useless Space for Towns, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 2, 
2001, at A1 (describing how some Pennsylvania cities are requiring big-box retailers to put 
money in escrow to cover demolition costs if the structure becomes vacant); Amanda Hurley, 
Empty Boxes: As Kmart’s Signature Blue Lights Fade, What Will Happen to Vacant Big-Box 
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stores are “transforming towns into blandly identical strips” by 
requiring aesthetic improvements on the typical big-box design.10 
Although there are no reported cases challenging these 
restrictions on aesthetic design, retailers may begin to fight back as 
these restrictions become more prevalent. One possible recourse for 
retailers is United States trademark law; however, this Note 
concludes that trademark protections, as currently interpreted in sign 
regulation cases, will generally not protect big-box architectural 
design features.11 In light of the greater number of municipal aesthetic 
regulations and current judicial interpretations that skew trademark 
law and fail to protect such design features, this Note argues that 
Congress should revisit this area of trademark law. 
This Note begins in Part I with an exposition of the competing 
interests concerning communities and big-box retailers when a big-
box store enters a community. A community must balance conflicting 
concerns: these stores can help boost the city’s economy and enhance 
shopping convenience, but they may also hurt small businesses and 
harm the aesthetics of the city. By imposing certain design constraints 
 
Stores?, Mar. 15, 2002, PRESERVATION ONLINE, at http://www.nationaltrust.org/magazine/ 
archives/arch_story/031502p.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing several 
abandoned big-box stores that have been converted into private schools); David Koeppel, 
Going Out of Business? They Can Help, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2001, at 14LI (Long Island 
Weekly Desk) (describing two companies that auction abandoned retail property in New  
York City). 
 10. Daykin, supra note 1. 
 11. Another possible avenue is arguing that these municipal restrictions violate the store’s 
freedom of expression as to architectural design. This is a weak argument, however, because 
courts have not yet recognized architecture as a form of protected expression. See, e.g., John 
Nivala, Constitutional Architecture: The First Amendment and the Single Family House, 33 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 291 (1996) (discussing whether aesthetic architectural restrictions violate the 
First Amendment). Even if architecture constituted protected expression, the Central Hudson 
test would likely apply to this type of expression because the architectural design for a store 
would be a form of commercial speech rather than political speech. See Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (defining commercial speech as 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience”); Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (defining 
commercial speech as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction” 
(quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973))); Thomas 
Pak, Note, Free Exercise, Free Expression, and Landmarks Preservation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1813, 1829–33 (1991) (arguing that commercial architecture should be classified as commercial 
speech and should have the weakest claim to free expression protection). Under this test, a 
challenge to commercial architectural design is likely to fail unless an ordinance is extremely 
broad and not narrowly tailored to the asserted governmental interest in protecting the 
aesthetic character of the community. 
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on big-box stores, a city reaps the economic advantages of the big-box 
retailer while protecting the aesthetic nature of the community. 
Although big-box retailers have been responsive to many design 
requests, they also carefully assess expense and the impact on brand 
identity. 
Part II describes the purpose of trademarks and the Lanham Act 
generally. It then discusses the history of section 1121(b), the section 
preventing municipalities from requiring “alterations” to a registered 
trademark, and the circuit split in applying section 1121(b). Part III 
applies section 1121(b) to the most common aesthetic restrictions 
imposed by municipalities on big-box retailers: color and building 
facade design. Part III concludes that, under the current 
interpretations of section 1121(b), only a few types of municipal 
restrictions of big-box retailers will violate trademark law. 
Finally, Part IV argues that the current application of section 
1121(b) will result in the decline of the big-box trademark. When 
Congress enacted section 1121(b), it did not foresee the prevalence of 
municipal restrictions on trademarks as a cause of consumer 
confusion. Therefore, Congress should revisit section 1121(b) in light 
of this recent trend in regulation in order to clarify the trademark 
rights of big-box retailers.  
I.  COMPETING INTERESTS 
The zoning of a big-box store requires consideration of the 
competing interests of both the community and the retailer. The 
community must consider the store’s impact on its economy and 
aesthetics while the retailer must consider the impact of aesthetic 
restrictions on its costs and brand identity. 
A. Community Interests  
Big-box retail facilities pose conflicting challenges to local zoning 
boards. Big-box stores can boost a city’s economy but can also hurt 
small businesses. They can enhance shopping convenience for 
consumers but can be aesthetic eyesores. In response to aesthetic 
concerns, many communities are now imposing aesthetic limitations 
on big-box store designs. This Part identifies two distinct types of 
restrictions: individual restrictions and municipal regulations on big-
box store design. 
The economic impact of big-box retailers on communities is 
often a double-edged sword. Big-box retailers provide a large number 
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of jobs for communities; Wal-Mart, for example, currently employs 
more than 1.2 million people in the United States.12 Further, in a 
comprehensive study analyzing the impact of Wal-Mart stores 
introduced in Iowa between 1982 and 1993, Professor Kenneth Stone 
found that when a Wal-Mart entered a town, total sales in that 
community increased at a greater rate than total sales in Iowa because 
individuals from neighboring towns came to shop at the Wal-Mart.13 
Businesses that sold different merchandise than the retailer benefited 
from increased traffic flow for at least the first few years.14 
However, Professor Stone found that businesses in the 
community that sold the same merchandise as Wal-Mart were in 
jeopardy.15 With the introduction of big-box retailers, consumers 
“fundamentally change” their shopping habits—purchasing more at 
mass merchandisers and less at local business.16 Further, though small 
towns with Wal-Marts increased their total sales by inducing 
neighboring consumers to shop at the Wal-Mart,17 small towns 
without Wal-Marts suffered heavy losses in sales, ranging from 16 to 
46 percent over the ten-year period that Professor Stone studied.18 
Despite this, cities often decide that the concerns of these small 
businesses are not sufficient to offset the possibility of increased tax 
revenue. Carlsbad, a California city that had “rejected most advances 
from [big-box] stores because they weren’t compatible with the city’s 
upscale, residential image and needs,” is considering changes to its 
city ordinances due to “economics.”19 A councilman explained, “We 
realize we’re going to get less money from the state in years to 
come. . . . These stores can generate $500,000 to $750,000 a year [in 
tax revenue].”20 
 
 12. Wal-Mart Online, www.walmartstores.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). 
 13. Kenneth E. Stone, Impact of Wal-Mart Stores on Iowa Communities: 1983–1993, ECON. 
DEV. REV., Spring 1995, at 60. 
 14. Id. at 61–62. After the first few years, towns tend to become saturated with big-box 
retailers and the influx of sales decreases. Id. 
 15. Id. at 61. 
 16. Id. at 69. 
 17. Id. at 61. 
 18. Id. at 69. 
 19. Elena Gaona, Requisites for Big-Box Stores Could Be Changed: Carlsbad Is Enticed By 
Increased Tax Revenue, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 13, 2004, at NC-1.  
 20. Gaona, supra note 19. Another City Manager explained his city’s decision to invite a 
Wal-Mart store by estimating that “a Wal-Mart could bring in $1 million in annual sales tax 
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Many time- and cost-conscious consumers also welcome big-box 
retailers for their convenience and low prices.21 When asked about a 
rezoning of a shopping mall to include a big-box grocery store, one 
resident believed that the mall would “enhance the area’s quality of 
life” because the city needed a larger place to shop.22 In a San 
Francisco Bay Area debate over a big-box grocery store, a seventy-
two-year-old retiree explained that she liked the big-box stores: 
“We’re seniors on a fixed income and these prices are unbelievable.”23 
At the same time, cities are concerned about the impact of the 
impersonal, box-like architecture on their communities. One county 
explained that: 
As a community, we should not only be concerned about the 
economic impact of big-box retailers on our traditional downtown 
merchants but also on how the appearance of such retail 
establishments fit [sic] in with the community. 
Our community does not have to rely on the dull, rectangular boxes 
of retail giants, with massive amounts of asphalt and limited 
landscaping and pedestrian amenities.24 
A commentator has argued that: “With blank, windowless facades, 
flat roofs, lack of architectural detail, and miniscule hard-to-see 
entrys [sic], big box stores are boring at best and future eye-sores at 
worst.”25 
The experiences of Mountain View and East Palo Alto acutely 
demonstrate these conflicting concerns. These neighboring California 
 
revenue.” Herb Booth, Potential Neighbors Meet with Wal-Mart: Homeowner Says Residents 
Concerned About Traffic, Crime, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 13, 2004, at 3N. 
 21. N.J. OFFICE OF STATE PLANNING, supra note 5, at 2: 
Studies indicate that today’s consumers have less interest in shopping, make fewer 
trips to shop, and buy more on each trip than in the past. Consumers consider saving 
time a priority, and they prefer stores offering ‘everyday low prices’ to occasional 
department store promotions or bargain-hunting from store to store.  
 22. Tom Zoellner, City Council Oks ‘Big Box’ Rezoning: Paves Way for Phoenix 
Development, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 2003, at B4. 
 23. Demian Bulwa, Around Mount Diablo: Low Prices Trump Big Box Store Issues, S.F. 
CHRON., Nov. 7, 2003, at E1. 
 24. GEORGETOWN-SCOTT COUNTY, BIG-BOX DESIGN STANDARDS, at 
http://www.gscplanning.com/big_box_design_standards.htm (last visited June 22, 2004) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal).  
 25. Chris Duerksen & Robert Blanchard, Belling the Box: Planning for Large-Scale Retail 
Stores, 1998 NAT’L PLAN. CONF., at http://www.asu.edu/caed/proceedings98/ Duerk/duerk.html 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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cities have allowed voters to decide controversial planning measures 
including the location of big-box retail stores.26 In East Palo Alto, a 
“struggling” municipality bordered by affluent neighborhoods, voters 
endorsed a plan to build a 300,000-square-foot Ikea store.27 The 
project promised about 550 jobs and at least $1 million in annual 
revenue to the city for eight years.28 In nearby Mountain View, a more 
affluent town, “the jobs and tax revenue offered by a Home Depot 
were not enough to sway voters.”29 Professor Rich DeLeon explained: 
“As communities become more affluent and more economically 
secure, they reach a level where other kinds of values and concerns 
take priority . . . such as aesthetics.”30 
For those cities that cannot economically afford to ban big-box 
retailers, requiring better architectural designs allows them to reap 
the consumer advantages of big-box retailers while preventing the use 
of drab architecture. This Note considers two types of aesthetic 
restrictions: (1) municipal regulations that place aesthetic design 
restrictions on all retail stores (“municipal regulations”), and (2) 
design restrictions imposed on individual stores during permit 
negotiations (“individual restrictions”). Concord, North Carolina, for 
example, adopted municipal regulations that require all big-box 
retailers to use a variety of materials on their building facades and to 
provide at least two amenities from a list that includes “a 
patio/seating area, a pedestrian plaza with benches, a transportation 
center, a window-shopping walkway, an outdoor playground area, a 
kiosk area, a water feature, and a clock tower.”31 In contrast, 
Germantown, Wisconsin imposed an individual restriction on a Home 
Depot, requiring that the store be designed with a “little bit of a 
German touch to the building.”32 
 
 26. Karen Alexander, Voters Approve 2 ‘Big Box’ Store Plans, Reject 2 Others, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 7, 2002, at B16. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Sarah Carr, Rules Are Spelled Out For ‘Big-Box’ Retailers: Developers of New Large 
Stores Must Now Provide Amenities, Reuse Plans, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 11, 2002, 
at 14U. 
 32. The Home Depot will have a limited amount of the company’s typical bright orange 
color on the building’s exterior and will use a dark brown color scheme. “The roof will be 
pitched in certain areas; the walls will have a stamped, decorative brick facade . . . and its 
canopy roof will have asphalt shingles instead of steel.” Daykin, supra note 1. 
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B. Big-Box Retailers’ Interests 
Although retailers have been responsive to some design requests, 
they carefully consider additional costs and potential impact on brand 
identity. Aesthetic improvements inevitably result in increased costs, 
which big-box retailers—as value-based sellers—must seek to 
minimize.33 If a community demands changes that are too costly, a 
retailer may decide not to build a store there and may move to 
another site. 34  
Stores also use exterior colors and layouts to create a “well-
known national identity” so that the store “remains familiar to 
customers.”35 Home Depot’s company real estate manager likened the 
store’s standard colors and design to the McDonald’s trademark: 
“Look at McDonald’s. . . . How many McDonald’s do you see with 
green arches?”36 The development manager for the Best Buy in San 
Francisco stated: “Our main, overriding goal throughout the project-
development process was to be sensitive to the architectural character 
inherent in the neighborhood while still maintaining our own 
character, our own brand image.”37 To achieve this goal, the San 
Francisco store’s exterior included Best Buy’s brand colors of blue 
and yellow along with various hues of green, a color commonly found 
in that neighborhood.38 
As more cities begin to impose architectural design 
requirements, big-box retailers must consider whether to challenge 
these restrictions, accede to the cities’ wishes, or refuse to build a 
store where originally planned and find another location for the store. 
The following Parts of this Note consider whether retailers can 
successfully challenge such restrictions under the Lanham Act. 
II.  THE LANHAM ACT SECTION 1121(B) 
The Lanham Act was enacted to protect federally registered 
trademarks and this Part describes section 1121(b), a provision 
instituted specifically to protect trademarks from local zoning and 
aesthetic regulations.  Section A begins with a general description of 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Wilson, supra note 3, at 118. 
 38. Id. at 119. 
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trademarks and the Lanham Act and explains that the principal aims 
of trademark law are the prevention of consumer confusion among 
brands and protection of the owner’s brand integrity. Section A then 
explains the general requirements for registering trademarks and 
trade dress. The remainder of this Part then discusses section 
1121(b)—the section of the Lanham Act that is pertinent to zoning 
regulations—which prohibits states and municipalities from requiring 
“alterations” to federally registered trademarks. First, Section B 
explains that the legislative history of section 1121(b) evinces an 
intention to except zoning and aesthetic regulations. Then, Section C 
analyzes the judicial interpretation of section 1121(b) in sign 
regulation cases and describes the divergence between the Second 
and Ninth Circuit interpretations. 
A. Trademarks and the Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act,39 which governs nationally registered marks,40 
defines a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device” used by 
a person in commerce to identify and distinguish goods from those 
manufactured by others.41 Trademarks, generally, perform four major 
functions: (1) identify a seller’s goods and distinguish them from 
other goods, (2) signify that all goods carrying that trademark are 
controlled by one source, (3) signify that all goods carrying that 
trademark are of equal quality, and (4) promote and advertise the 
sale of the goods.42 
 
 39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2000). 
 40. “The term ‘mark’ includes any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or 
certification mark.” Id. § 1127. 
 41. Id. 
The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof— 
(1) used by a person, or 
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to 
register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify and 
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if 
that source is unknown. 
Id. Similarly, a service mark is any word, name, symbol, or device which is used by a person or 
which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce to identify and distinguish the 
services of one person from the services of others. Id. This Note refers to both service marks 
and trademarks as trademarks. 
 42. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 3:2 (4th ed. 2003). 
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Trademark laws seek “to prevent the public from encountering 
confusion, mistake, and deception in the purchase of goods and 
services and to protect the integrity of the trademark owner’s product 
identity.”43 The recognition of a particular trademarked symbol is 
critical to a retailer. As Justice Frankfurter once explained:  
A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a 
purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe 
he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by 
making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market 
with the drawing power of a congenial symbol.44 
This “congenial symbol” embodies both the utilitarian functions of 
the product itself and a “psychic load” of intangible and nonutilitarian 
psychological factors that surround the product.45 In advertising a car, 
for example, a manufacturer wishes to express that a car is more than 
a mere method of conveyance—it is also an expression of the 
consumer’s personality and a status symbol.46 The purpose of creating 
and registering this congenial symbol is always “to convey through 
the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the 
commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-
mark owner has something of value.”47 
For a symbol to be registered as a trademark under the Lanham 
Act, the symbol must be nonfunctional and distinctive.48 A symbol is 
functional and cannot serve as a trademark if it “is essential to the use 
or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the 
article.”49 Functional terms and features are barred from registration 
as trademarks for two basic public policy rationales. First, the 
functionality bar preserves free and effective competition by ensuring 
 
 43. Application of Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
 44. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
 45. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 2:37. 
 46. 1 id. 
 47. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co., 316 U.S. at 205. 
 48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2000) (providing an ex parte bar on trademark registration 
when the symbol is functional); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), (e)(1)–(3) (providing an ex parte bar on 
trademark registration when the symbol is not inherently distinctive).  
 49. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (internal citation 
omitted). If a feature is not essential to the use or purpose of a product but the marketer of the 
product advertises the utilitarian advantages of the feature, that advertisement is strong 
evidence of its functionality. See, e.g., Am. Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imps., Inc., 807 F.2d 
1136, 1149 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that “tummy graphics” on Care Bears were functional 
symbols because they conveyed cheerful emotions and the professed function of Care Bears was 
to create positive emotions). 
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that competitors can copy essential features of a product and that no 
manufacturer can establish a monopoly through a trademark.50 
Second, it accommodates the principle that patent law is the only 
legal source of exclusive rights to functional items.51 
An identifying mark is distinctive and may be protected if it 
either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness 
through a secondary meaning.52 Marks are often classified by Judge 
Friendly’s hierarchy of distinctiveness,53 first formulated in 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.: 54 (1) generic,55 (2) 
descriptive,56 (3) suggestive,57 (4) arbitrary,58 or (5) fanciful.59 Generic 
marks are the least distinctive and fanciful marks are the most 
distinctive. Thus, generic marks can never be trademarked.60 
Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are inherently distinctive 
 
 50. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 7:63. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). 
 53. See, e.g., id. at 768 (approving of Judge Friendly’s “classic formulation”). 
 54. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 55. Generic marks “refer to the genus of which the particular product is a species.” Two 
Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (citing Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,  
194 (1985)). 
 56. A mark is “descriptive” if it describes: “the intended purpose, function or use of the 
goods; the size of the goods, the provider of the goods, the class of users of the goods, a 
desirable characteristic of the goods, the nature of the goods, or the end effect upon the user.” 2 
MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 11:16; see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 10 (“A term 
is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or 
characteristics of the goods.”). 
 57. “A term is suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a 
conclusion as to the nature of goods.” Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 10. However, the 
distinction between suggestive and descriptive marks is somewhat unclear. See Franklin Knitting 
Mills, Inc. v. Fashionit Sweater Mills, Inc., 297 F. 247, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Hand, J.) (stating, in 
describing the descriptive-suggestive distinction, that “[i]t is quite impossible to get any rule out 
of the cases beyond this: That the validity of the mark ends where suggestion ends and 
description begins”), aff’d, 4 F.2d 1018, 1018 (2d Cir. 1925); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 
42, § 11:64 (discussing this distinction in detail). 
 58. An arbitrary term consists of common words that are used in an unfamiliar and 
nondescriptive way so that the word neither describes nor suggests the product or service. For 
example, the word “apple” does not evoke an image of a computer but Apple is a trademark for 
a computer company. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, §§ 11:11, 11:13. 
 59. A fanciful term is one that is invented or selected solely for its use as a trademark. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 n.12; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 11:5. Fanciful 
marks are considered the strongest of all marks because their inherent novelty may substantially 
impact the consumer. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 11:6. 
 60. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768. 
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and entitled to protection.61 Descriptive marks are not inherently 
distinctive but may be trademarked if they carry a “secondary 
meaning” of identifying a particular brand.62 A “secondary meaning” 
exists when “in addition to their literal, or dictionary, meaning, words 
connote to the public a product from a unique source.”63 For example, 
the Supreme Court held that the term “Nu-Enamel,” although 
descriptive of enamel paints, had attained a secondary meaning 
because it had come to be associated with a particular company’s 
brand of paint.64 
Because “human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ 
almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning,”65 there are 
many different forms of subject matter that can be trademarked. One 
pertinent form is trade dress. Trade dress is an expansive concept that 
refers to the “total image” of a product.66 For example, the distinctive 
decor, style, and menu of a restaurant,67 and the use of a lighthouse as 
part of the design of a golf course68 have been recognized as trade 
dress. Trade dress may be registered if it is (1) recognized by 
customers to identify and distinguish the source, (2) distinctive, and 
(3) nonfunctional.69 In 2000, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 
the Supreme Court added the further nuance that although product 
design trade dress can never be inherently distinctive and must have a 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 769. 
Marks which are merely descriptive of a product are not inherently distinctive. When 
used to describe a product, they do not inherently identify a particular source, and 
hence cannot be protected. However, descriptive marks may acquire the 
distinctiveness which will allow them to be protected under the [Lanham] Act. . . . 
This acquired distinctiveness is generally called “secondary meaning.” 
Id. 
 63. Charcoal Steak House of Charlotte, Inc. v. Staley, 139 S.E.2d. 185, 187 (N.C. 1964). 
 64. Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 336 (1938). 
 65. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (noting that the 
particular shape of the Coca-Cola bottle, the particular sound of NBC’s three chimes, and a 
particular scent of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread have been trademarked). 
 66. See John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(“‘Trade dress’ involves the total image of a product and may include features such as size, 
shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”); 1 
MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 8:1 (providing definitions of trade dress). 
 67. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765, 776. 
 68. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 542 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 69. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 8:7 (stating that trade dress may be registered if it 
meets the requirements for trademark protection); supra notes 48–62 and accompanying text. 
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secondary meaning to be protected as a trade dress,70 product 
packaging trade dress may be inherently distinctive.71 For example, in 
Wal-Mart Stores, the Court explained a prior holding that a 
restaurant’s Mexican decor was inherently distinctive as because the 
restaurant’s decor constituted product packaging trade dress.72 
Further, section 1125(a) of the Lanham Act protects even 
unregistered trade dress from trade dress infringement if the allegedly 
infringing design would be likely to cause confusion as to the 
product’s source.73  
Though color will typically be an integral part of a product’s 
trade dress, a color or color scheme independently qualifies for 
trademark protection. In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,74 the 
Supreme Court considered whether a special shade of green-gold 
used in Qualitex’s scrubbing pads could be registered as a trademark. 
The Court held that a single color could be registered as a trademark 
under certain conditions.75 First, the color must act as a symbol.76 
Second, because a color can never be inherently distinctive, the color 
must have attained secondary meaning.77 Third, the color must not 
have a functional purpose; it must be used solely as a symbol.78 Under 
 
 70. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000); see also 1 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 42, § 8:12.1 (describing the Wal-Mart rule). 
 71. See, e.g., Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 40–41 (1st Cir. 
2001) (holding that the appearance of a decorative candle product line and catalog layout were 
product design trade dress and not packaging). Courts have differentiated between product 
design and packaging trade dress in a “common sense” fashion, “asking what is the primary 
product that the buyer is purchasing.” 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 8:12.1. 
 72. See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 214–15 (explaining the Two Pesos decision in which 
the restaurant’s decor was held to be inherently distinctive); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 
505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 7:54. 
 74. 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
 75. Id. at 166. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.; see also Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211–12 (“Indeed, with respect to at least one 
category of mark—colors—we have held that no mark can ever be inherently distinctive. . . . We 
held that a color could be protected as a trademark, but only upon a showing of secondary 
meaning.” (citing Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162–63)). The requirement of secondary meaning for 
color and product design trade dress comports with Judge Friendly’s formulation for increasing 
distinctiveness because both color and product design are descriptive terms that convey an idea 
of the qualities and characteristics of the goods. See supra notes 53–62 and accompanying text. 
 78. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166; see, e.g., Warner Lambert Co. v. McCrory’s Corp., 718 F. 
Supp. 389, 396–97 (D.N.J. 1989) (explaining that the amber color of Listerine was functional 
because an amber liquid had taken on the significance of being an unflavored, medicinal 
mouthwash in the mouthwash industry); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 98 
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this analysis, the Court held that the Qualitex scrubbing pad’s green-
gold color could be trademarked given that it acted as a symbol to 
identify the Qualitex brand and served no other function.79 
B. The History of Section 1121(b) 
Congress added section 1121(b) to the Lanham Act in 1982 in 
response to problems encountered by the Century 21 Real Estate 
Corporation.80 In 1978, a Nevada federal district permitted the 
Nevada Real Estate Advisory Commission to regulate Century 21’s 
registered trademark.81 Century 21, a nationally recognized franchisor 
of real estate firms, allocated 80 percent of all display space for the 
national Century 21 trademark and reserved the remaining 20 percent 
for the franchisee’s name.82 To protect the public from being misled 
about the nature of the franchisor-franchisee relationship, the Nevada 
Real Estate Advisory Commission required that the trademark cover 
50 percent of any display and that the remaining 50 percent be 
reserved for the franchisee’s name.83 This Nevada regulation applied 
to all displays of the trademark, including “signs, letterheads, business 
cards, brochures, uniforms, name tags, folders, checks, forms, memo 
pads, desk plates, display materials, marketing materials, 
advertisements, etc.”84 
Century 21 objected to this regulation arguing, inter alia, that this 
regulation would dilute its registered trademark and violate the 
Lanham Act.85 The district court held that the state regulation did not 
violate the Lanham Act because the Act “contains no manifestation 
of a Congressional intent comprehensively to control all aspects of 
 
(S.D. Iowa 1982) (explaining that the green color used by John Deere tractors was functional 
and not protected because farmers prefer to have matching farm equipment colors); see also 1 
MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 7:49 (documenting a wide variety of cases in which a product’s 
color could not be trademarked because it was used for a functional purpose).  
 79. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166. 
 80. Section 1121(b) is commonly referred to as the “Century 21” amendment. Payless 
Shoesource, Inc. v. Town of Penfield, 934 F. Supp. 540, 542–43 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).  
 81. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Nev. Real Estate Advisory Comm’n, 448 F. Supp. 
1237, 1242 (D. Nev. 1978), aff’d mem., 440 U.S. 941 (1979), and superseded by 15 U.S.C.  
§ 1121(b) (2000). 
 82. Id. at 1239. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Payless Shoesource, 934 F. Supp. at 543 (discussing Century 21). 
 85. Century 21, 448 F. Supp. at 1241. Century 21 also objected on First Amendment, due 
process, equal protection, and Commerce Clause grounds. Id. at 1239–41.  
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the trademark field.”86 In other words, the district court held that a 
state or municipality could require statewide changes to all uses of a 
nationally registered trademark. 
After the Century 21 decision, other states adopted similar rules, 
which “inhibited nationwide advertising campaigns, increased costs, 
and made the franchisor-franchisee relationship less appealing.”87 
Congress enacted section 1121(b) to remedy these problems; it 
provides, in pertinent part: “No State or other jurisdiction of the 
United States or any political subdivision or any agency thereof may 
require alteration of a registered mark . . . .”88 During the hearings on 
section 1121(b), Representative Barney Frank questioned whether 
section 1121(b) would interfere with local aesthetic or historic zoning. 
He argued that, in areas where all signs must be of a certain type of 
lettering, such as gothic lettering, he did not want this section to allow 
different lettering.89 He stated, “[I]f there was a uniform zoning 
requirement . . . I would not want this to be preemptive [of it].”90 
Gerald Mossinghoff, the Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks, responded to Representative Frank’s concerns, by 
explaining that section 1121(b) would not interfere with uniform 
zoning requirements.91 Representative Jerry M. Patterson, author of 
the bill, summarized the amendment as “narrowly written.”92 He 
explained that it would “not interfere with nor [sic] question the 
 
 86. Id. at 1241. 
 87. Payless Shoesource, 934 F. Supp. at 543; see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Regulating 
Trademarks on Exterior Signs: Should Local Law Trump the Lanham Act and the Constitution?, 
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1119 (1998) (discussing the economic ramifications of requiring 
national advertising to meet state regulations and local franchisees to bear the expense of 
changing displays and advertising materials to comply with state regulations). 
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2000). The complete section is as follows: 
No State or other jurisdiction of the United States or any political subdivision or any 
agency thereof may require alteration of a registered mark, or require that additional 
trademarks, service marks, trade names, or corporate names that may be associated 
with or incorporated into the registered mark be displayed in the mark in a manner 
differing from the display of such additional trademarks, service marks, trade names, 
or corporate names contemplated by the registered mark as exhibited in the 
certificate of registration issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 
Id. 
 89. Lanham Trademark Act Amendment: Hearing on H.R. 5154 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 
10–11 (1982) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank). 
 90. Id. at 11. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 13 (statement of Hon. Jerry M. Patterson). 
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validity of other State regulations that only indirectly affect the use of 
a trademark—for example, municipal ordinances that ban neon signs, 
some of which may contain registered marks, from certain 
neighborhoods.”93 As a result, the House Judiciary Committee Report 
issued after this exchange stated: 
During the course of Committee debate Mr. Frank raised the issue 
of whether the bill would in any way restrict the zoning or historic 
site protection laws or regulations of states. On the advice of 
counsel, the Committee concludes that the bill in no way affects the 
powers of state and local governments in [these] areas of 
concern . . . .94  
Thus, although the plain language of section 1121(b) seems to 
prohibit state and municipal trademark regulations, the legislative 
history creates confusion by indicating that aesthetic and zoning 
requirements are exempt from the section 1121(b) prohibition. 
C. The Circuit Split on Section 1121(b)95 
The first reported case involving section 1121(b), Payless 
Shoesource, Inc. v. Town of Penfield,96 involved a sign restriction at a 
shopping center where all signs were required to be yellow, red, or 
white.97 This restriction prohibited Payless from erecting a sign 
reflecting its registered yellow and orange trademark, and Payless 
argued that this was a violation of section 1121(b).98 The court 
determined that the meaning of “alteration” in section 1121(b) was 
“not entirely clear” from the language of the statute and proceeded to 
look at the legislative history.99 Based on the legislative discussion 
between Congressman Frank and Commissioner Mossinghoff, the 
court held that aesthetic zoning did not constitute an “alteration” 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. H.R. REP. NO. 97-778, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2621, 2622. 
 95. There is sparse legal history on the application of section 1121(b). All of the currently 
reported cases are discussed in this Section. 
 96. 934 F. Supp. 540, 540 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). Payless refers to two unpublished cases in 
reaching its decision: Motel 6 Operating L.P. v. City of S. Lake Tahoe, No. Civ-S-90-0527 (E.D. 
Cal. Oct. 25, 1990) and Calpalbo v. Planning & Zoning Bd. of Appeals, Greenwich, No. 23 20 60 
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 17, 1987). Id. at 545.  
 97. Id. at 541. 
 98. Id. at 541–42. 
 99. Id. at 543. 
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within the meaning of section 1121(b).100 The court then determined 
that, unlike the Century 21 restriction, this was “simply” a uniform 
sign restriction because only Payless’s exterior sign was affected by 
the regulation and all other uses of Payless’s trademark remained 
unimpaired.101 Therefore, the court concluded that this was an 
aesthetic zoning regulation and did not constitute an alteration to 
Payless’s trademark.102 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Lisa’s Party City v. 
Town of Henrietta,103 agreed with the Payless interpretation of section 
1121(b) and held that a town ordinance requiring single-color exterior 
signs did not alter Party City’s multicolored registered logo given that 
other uses of the logo were unimpaired.104 Similar to the district court 
in Payless, the Second Circuit held that because the legislative history 
established that aesthetic zoning did not constitute an “alteration,” 
this uniform sign restriction did not modify Party City’s trademark.105 
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Blockbuster 
Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe,106 interpreted section 1121(b) differently 
in a case involving two plaintiffs, Video Update and Blockbuster 
Videos.107 Similar to Payless and Lisa’s Party City, plaintiff Video 
Update argued that the city’s requirement of white lettering on a 
turquoise background altered its nationally registered logo, which had 
red lettering.108 Plaintiff Blockbuster presented a slightly different 
problem: the city allowed Blockbuster’s “torn ticket” logo but 
completely disallowed the installation of its federally registered blue 
awning with yellow lettering.109 
 
 100. Id. at 543–45. 
 101. See id. at 546 (“Stated simply, plaintiff has confused its sign with its trademark.”). 
 102. Id. 
 103. 185 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1999). Payless was decided in a New York district court, within the 
Second Circuit’s jurisdiction. Payless Shoesource, 934 F. Supp. at 540. 
 104. Lisa’s Party City, 185 F.3d at 17–18. 
 105. Id. at 15–16. 
 106. 141 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 107. Id. at 1300; see also Kwall, supra note 87, at 1150 (concluding that, consistent with the 
Blockbuster holding, section 1121(b) should preempt local signage laws that require alteration 
of “mainstream trademarkable elements” (e.g., color, font) but local signage laws may require 
alterations of less traditionally trademarked properties (e.g., size, awnings) based upon a 
weighing of interests).  
 108. Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1296–97. 
 109. Id. at 1297. 
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The Ninth Circuit determined, first, that the meaning of 
“alteration” was clear from the plain language of the statute and, 
using a dictionary, defined alteration as “to cause to become different 
in some particular characteristic . . . without changing into something 
else . . . .”110 The court determined that the city was requiring Video 
Update to change its lettering color, which was one characteristic of 
its trademark.111 Therefore, the court held that Tempe had required 
an alteration of Video Update’s trademark, in violation of section 
1121(b).112 
After noting that the court need not look to the legislative 
history because of the clear statutory language, the court interpreted 
the legislative history to support its view.113 The legislative history 
indicated that, although a city could not require a change in a 
trademark’s color, it could completely prohibit the installation of a 
trademark that fell afoul of aesthetic zoning laws.114 Based upon this 
reading of the legislative history, the Ninth Circuit determined that, 
although the city could not require Video Update to change its 
trademark’s color, the city could completely prohibit Blockbuster 
from installing the registered awning.115 This reveals an inherent 
tension in the Blockbuster holding: whereas the Ninth Circuit 
declined to follow the Second Circuit in allowing cities to “displace” a 
trademark by requiring it to be a different color or size, it permitted 
the arguably more drastic measure of entirely “replacing” trademarks 
with generic signs.116 
 
 110. Id. at 1297–98 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 63 (3d 
ed. 1986)). 
 111. Id. at 1298. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1299–1300: 
Mr. Frank asked whether section 1121(b) would prohibit regulations that might 
specify the color and type of lettering on a sign. He then answered his own question 
by stating that such regulations might simply prevent a business from displaying its 
trademark on the outside of the building: “They could say, ‘real estate’ outside; inside 
the protected registered trademark would be allowed.” These statements indicate an 
acknowledgment that zoning regulations may prohibit the display of trademarks on 
storefront signs, without violating section 1121(b). They do not suggest zoning 
regulations may require the alteration of a mark. 
 114. Id.; see also Gateway 2000 Country Stores, Inc. v. Norwalk Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 13 
F. Supp. 2d 247, 252–53 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding, based upon Blockbuster, that a Gateway 2000 
store was not entitled to a preliminary injunction restraining a zoning board of appeals from 
completely prohibiting two awnings and a pylon with the Gateway 2000 logo). 
 115. Blockbuster, 141 F.3d at 1300. 
 116. Jeffrey W. Strouse, Note, Redefining Trademark Alteration Within the Context of 
Aesthetic-Based Zoning Laws: A Blockbuster Dilemma, 53 VAND. L. REV. 717, 745 (2000). 
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The divergence between the Second and Ninth Circuits lies in 
their definition of “alteration” under section 1121(b). The Second 
Circuit interprets an “alteration” as a requirement that all forms of 
the trademark be changed in some way; therefore, a uniform sign 
restriction that only requires changes to one form of the trademark 
(e.g., a sign in an individual store) does not constitute an alteration. 
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, defines an “alteration” as a 
requirement to change any aspect of a trademark (even in an 
individual location); therefore, a uniform sign restriction does 
constitute an alteration. However, under the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation, although a city may not impose a uniform sign 
restriction, a city may prohibit the display of a trademark altogether. 
III.  APPLYING THE CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 
1121(B) 
The split between the Second and Ninth Circuit in applying 
section 1121(b) is not merely semantic. The law as applied in the 
Second Circuit could lead to an entirely different outcome than if 
analyzed under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation. This is especially 
troubling as it creates uncertainty for big-box retailers that often 
operate on a nationwide scale. This Part analyzes two such 
incongruous outcomes with regard to the most commonly regulated 
architectural features of big-box retail facilities: color and building 
facade design.117  
A. Color 
Big-box retailers often use standard exterior colors to help create 
a national image. Home Depot, for example, uses bright orange on its 
exterior and continues this theme by using bright orange on uniforms 
and on its website.118 Cities have regulated these standard exterior 
colors through municipal ordinances. For example, in Fort Collins, 
 
Strouse explains this strange paradox of the decision by the Blockbuster court. He then argues 
that the term “alteration” should be limited to situations that are like the Century 21 decision; in 
other words, municipalities should be able to require replacement of a trademark with another 
symbol as long as they do not require replacement of all forms of the trademark. Id. at 745–47.  
 117. Although sign regulation is a common method to regulate store features, this Note will 
not consider this method of regulation because it is a vast subject. For thorough discussions of 
sign regulation and section 1121(b), see generally Kwall, supra note 87, and Strouse, supra  
note 116. 
 118. Home Depot Website, at www.homedepot.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). 
MCCONNELL FINISHED.DOC 12/20/2004  3:29 PM 
1556 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1537 
Colorado, the Summary of Standards and Guidelines requires that 
“[f]acades shall be of low reflectance, subtle, neutral or earth tone 
colors. The use of high intensity colors, metallic colors, black or 
fluorescent colors is prohibited . . . . Building trim and accent areas 
may feature brighter colors, including primary colors, but neon tubing 
shall not be an acceptable feature.”119 Under this ordinance, Home 
Depot might be required to minimize the amount of bright orange on 
its exterior.  
Cities may also regulate a store’s usual exterior colors through 
individual requirements. For example, in Germantown, Wisconsin, 
the planned Home Depot store will have a “limited amount of [Home 
Depot’s] bright orange color on the building’s exterior” and the main 
color scheme will be dark brown instead of beige.120 
To protect its color from these restrictions, a big-box retailer 
could (1) attempt to trademark a “general” color, or (2) attempt to 
trademark an “exterior” color.121 As this Part illustrates, the choice of 
scope for trademark could make a difference in the application of 
section 1121(b). This Note uses the term “general color” to denote a 
color used throughout an entire store; “exterior color” refers to a 
color used solely on the exterior of its buildings. As an illustration, if 
Big-Box Store wanted to trademark a general color, it would attempt 
to register “fluorescent pink” as a trademark that would protect its 
exterior colors, uniforms, signs, etc. Instead, to trademark only an 
exterior color, Big-Box Store would attempt to trademark 
“fluorescent pink when used on the outside of buildings.”122 Although 
trademarking a general color would include the exterior color, this 
Section demonstrates that trademarking only an exterior color could 
 
 119. See MD. DEP’T OF PLANNING, supra note 5, at 46 (citing Fort Collins, Colorado 
guidelines as an example of a big-box regulatory strategy). 
 120. Daykin, supra note 1. 
 121. Although the unanimous Qualitex decision recognizing colors as eligible for trademark 
protection has quenched most debate in this area, see supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text, 
prior to Qualitex, some courts and commentators resisted recognizing trademark protection for 
colors on the basis of the “color depletion theory.” The color depletion theory argues that 
“there are a limited number of colors in the palette, and that it is not wise policy to foster 
further limitation by permitting trademark registrants to deplete the reservoir.” In re Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 122. Although this Part refers to the trademarking of one color, the same analysis would 
apply if a big-box retailer wanted to trademark a combination of colors, as when, in Qualitex, 
the company wanted to trademark its green-gold combination. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. 
Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995). 
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create a loophole through which a big-box retailer could protect its 
distinctive image. 
1. Applying Section 1121(b) to a Trademarked General Color. 
To assess if restrictions on an exterior color are valid under the 
Lanham Act, the first step is to determine whether a general color is 
eligible for trademark protection. In Qualitex, the Supreme Court 
held that a single color of a product can be registered as a trademark 
if it meets the requirements of a trademark.123 Thus, to register a color 
as a trademark, a company must prove that the color (1) acts as a 
symbol, (2) has the secondary meaning of identifying a particular 
brand, and (3) is nonfunctional.124 Hypothetically, if Big-Box Store 
could show that the fluorescent pink color used on its signs, exterior 
trimmings, uniforms, websites, and advertisements acted as a symbol, 
had the secondary meaning of identifying the store, and was 
nonfunctional, then it could register fluorescent pink as a trademark. 
Assuming that a company did trademark a general color and a 
city attempted to restrict the use of this color, the retailer could argue 
that the restrictions are contrary to section 1121(b).125 Given the 
circuit split on the interpretation of section 1121(b), the following 
analysis applies both formulations of section 1121(b) to trademarked 
colors. 
First, under the Second Circuit’s Lisa’s Party City interpretation, 
regulations that do not impair all uses of the trademark are not 
“alterations” under section 1121(b) and are therefore allowable. 
Because Party City’s trademark was used in uniforms, interior signs, 
exterior signs, etc., a regulation prohibiting an exterior sign did not 
 
 123. See id. at 166 (holding that the green-gold colors on a scrubbing pad qualified for 
trademark protection); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d at 1122–23 (holding that the 
nonfunctional color pink for Pink Panther fiberglass insulation could be registered as a 
trademark upon proof of secondary meaning); see also supra notes 74–79 and  
accompanying text. 
 124. See supra notes 39–64 and accompanying text. 
 125. For section 1121(b) to apply, the company must have registered the color as a 
trademark. An unregistered color would be protected against trademark infringement only 
under section 1125(a), as part of the trade dress. For example, Big-Box Store’s unregistered 
fluorescent pink color would be protected under section 1125(a) only in the event that “Ma and 
Pa Store” also used fluorescent pink in its store, creating a likelihood of confusion as to the 
source of the brand. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 770 (1992) (holding that 
the plaintiff’s unregistered Tex-Mex interior was protected under section 1125(a) because the 
competing restaurant with similar Tex-Mex interior was likely to cause confusion as to the 
source of the product). 
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impair all uses of the trademark.126 As applied here, a restriction on 
the use of a trademarked color on the exterior of a big-box facility 
would constitute an allowable form of aesthetic regulation because it 
would not impair all uses of the trademarked color. 
For example, if a city prohibited Big-Box Store from using 
fluorescent pink trimmings on its exterior through either an 
individual restriction or a municipal regulation, the store could still 
use fluorescent pink on its uniforms, signs, website, memos, etc., and 
the Second Circuit would interpret this to be an allowable uniform 
aesthetic restriction. As such restrictions are not “alterations” under 
section 1121(b), the city restriction would be valid and the store 
would be required to comply. 
By contrast, under the Ninth Circuit’s Blockbuster interpretation, 
section 1121(b) allows a city to completely prohibit a trademark but 
does not allow the city to require a change in the trademark’s color.127 
A city, then, could completely prohibit Big-Box Store from using its 
trademarked fluorescent pink color on its exterior by either a 
municipal ordinance or an individual restriction. The city could not 
require, however, that Big-Box Store use a different color (e.g., light 
pink instead of fluorescent pink).128 Thus, under both the Second 
Circuit’s and Ninth Circuit’s interpretations, the city could prohibit 
Big-Box Store from using fluorescent pink on its exterior.   
2. Applying Section 1121(b) to a Trademarked Exterior Color. 
An exterior color is part of the trade dress of a particular product.129 
In this case, the exterior colors could be classified as the packaging 
trade dress of the big-box retailer.130 These exterior colors could be 
trademarked if they (1) acted as a symbol, (2) had a secondary 
meaning of identifying a particular brand,131 and (3) were 
nonfunctional.132 
 
 126. See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra notes 106–16 and accompanying text. 
 128. This strange result of Blockbuster is discussed in detail by Kwall, supra note 87, 
at 120–21. 
 129. See supra notes 65–73 and accompanying text. 
 130. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 214–15 (2002) (describing the 
distinction between product packaging trade dress and product design trade dress). 
 131. Although product packaging trade dress may be inherently distinctive, color is never 
inherently distinctive, and a retailer would thus have to show a color’s secondary meaning. See 
supra notes 66–79 and accompanying text. 
 132. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
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Based upon a similar analysis, Eastman Kodak Co. received 
limited protection of its yellow, black, and red trade dress when a 
competing photo developer used those colors on its photo kiosks.133 
Similarly, a court found the black and red color scheme of the Red 
Top taxicab company eligible for trademark protection because 
patrons had attached a secondary meaning to those colors.134 
Likewise, Checker Cab Co. registered a checkered band around a 
taxicab body as its trademark.135 Based upon these cases, if Big-Box 
Store could show that the fluorescent pink color on its exterior 
trimmings acted as an identification symbol and was nonfunctional, 
Big-Box Store could trademark the fluorescent pink color when used 
on the exterior of its facilities.136 
Under the Second Circuit’s Lisa’s Party City interpretation, the 
term “alteration” in section 1121(b) describes “state-mandated 
changes in the mark itself, which are, of necessity, reflected in every 
subsequent display of that mark within the relevant jurisdiction.”137 
The use of an individual restriction to regulate a registered exterior 
color would not impair all forms of the trademark because other 
stores in the jurisdiction (the city) could still use the exterior color 
trademark. If Big-Box Store registered its fluorescent pink exterior as 
a trademark and a city individually restricted its use of fluorescent 
pink at X Street, Big-Box Store could still use its fluorescent pink 
exterior at its store on Y Street in that city. 
However, a municipal ordinance that restricts a trademarked 
exterior color poses a unique problem. Ordinances that prohibit the 
use of trademarked exterior colors throughout the entire jurisdiction 
restrict every “subsequent display of that mark.” For example, if Big-
Box Store registered its fluorescent pink exterior color as a trademark 
and a city prohibited any use of fluorescent pink exterior color 
throughout the city, all forms of the trademark would be impaired 
within the jurisdiction of that city. Under the Second Circuit’s 
 
 133. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fotomat Corp., 317 F. Supp. 304, 322 (N.D. Ga. 1969). 
 134. Transp., Inc. v. Mayflower Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 952, 954–55 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 135. Ex parte Checker Cab Mfg. Corp., 99 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 480 (Comm’r Pat. 1953). 
 136. See also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 42, § 7:48 (“Colors can be protected as an element 
of a distinctive building design which serves a trademark function.”).  
 137. Lisa’s Party City v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1304 (9th Cir. 1998) (Browning, J., 
dissenting)). “Jurisdiction,” in this sense, means the government’s jurisdiction; if a city were 
maintaining a municipal ordinance, the jurisdiction would be that particular city. 
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interpretation of section 1121(b), then, a municipal ordinance that 
regulates the use of a trademarked exterior color violates section 
1121(b). Clearly, this is not the intent of the Second Circuit in 
interpreting of section 1121(b) when it found that zoning 
requirements generally do not force “alterations” or changes to 
trademarks; this seems to be a loophole through which to challenge 
uniform aesthetic regulations on exterior colors.138 
By contrast, applying the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 
1121(b) yields the same result for an exterior color as for a general 
color. Given that a city can completely prohibit a trademark but 
cannot require a change in the individual trademark, the city could 
completely prohibit Big-Box Store from using fluorescent pink 
exterior trimmings but could not require it to use light pink rather 
than fluorescent pink as its exterior color. In sum, then, except for the 
rare case, a city will be able to regulate all exterior colors used on a 
big-box store. 
B. The Building Facade  
Cities typically regulate two different portions of the building 
facade: exterior building materials and the design of the building 
facade. Unlike color, big-box retailers will find that these elements 
are difficult to trademark due to their functionality and lack of 
distinctiveness. Further, even if retailers trademark these elements, as 
with color, cities will be able to regulate these facade elements under 
both the Second and Ninth Circuit interpretations.  
1. Exterior Building Materials. Big-box retailers typically use 
precast concrete on the building facade of retail facilities.139 In 
response, many cities are now creating municipal ordinances that 
require higher quality materials on the facade. In Fort Collins, 
Colorado, for instance, the city’s Summary Standards and Guidelines 
require that: 
Predominant exterior building materials shall be high quality 
materials. These include, without limitation: brick, sandstone, other 
 
 138. See Lisa’s Party City, 185 F.3d at 15 (arguing that section 1121(b) was designed to force 
changes in trademarks and that aesthetic and zoning restrictions do not effect such changes). 
 139. Daykin, supra note 1. 
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native stone, wood and concrete masonry units that are tinted and 
textured.140 
Cities also require individual stores to use higher quality materials on 
building facades. For example, the Germantown, Wisconsin Home 
Depot will use brick on its exterior facade instead of precast 
concrete.141 
Although a big-box retailer could attempt to register the precast 
concrete material as part of its trade dress, these building materials 
usually would not receive trademark protection. Generally, a precast 
concrete facade does not act as a symbol of any particular big-box 
store. Additionally, it does not carry a secondary meaning of 
identification because it is used by many stores and many buildings. 
Precast concrete building material is also functional because it affects 
the price of the packaging trade dress.142 Therefore, such exterior 
building material could be neither registered as a trademark nor 
protected under section 1121(b). Thus, regulations concerning 
acceptable building materials would be valid under the Lanham Act.  
2. Design of the Building Facade. Every big-box store has a 
typical building facade design that generally includes a large sign and 
a plain exterior.143 Some cities have enacted regulations that require 
improvements on this design. Portland, Oregon, requires stores to 
“[i]ncorporate Portland related themes into a project design, where 
appropriate” and “[e]nhance the identity of Special Districts by 
incorporating small-scale features that add to the District’s identity 
and ambiance.”144 Other cities require specific improvements to 
building facades before granting building permits. Evergreen, 
Colorado, for example, required a Wal-Mart to include an “oak 
portico over stone pillars” and a Wal-Mart in Kitty Hawk, North 
Carolina, is being designed to look like an early twentieth-century 
coast guard lifesaving station.145 
A big-box retailer wary of such changes could protect the 
architectural design of its typical building facade as a part of a 
 
 140. MD. DEP’T OF PLANNING, supra note 5, at 46. 
 141. Daykin, supra note 1. 
 142. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 143. Although color and the design of the exterior facade are often regulated together, this 
Section considers only restrictions on the design itself. 
 144. MD. DEP’T OF PLANNING, supra note 5, at 44. 
 145. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
MCCONNELL FINISHED.DOC 12/20/2004  3:29 PM 
1562 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1537 
product packaging trade dress. The retailer would argue that the 
exterior facade acts as a symbol, is either inherently distinctive or has 
a secondary meaning of identifying the retailer, and is nonfunctional. 
In Two Pesos, the Supreme Court held that the Mexican-themed 
exterior and interior trade dress of a restaurant was protectable 
because it was inherently distinctive, acted as a symbol of the Taco 
Cabana brand, and was nonfunctional.146 A lower court similarly held 
that a castle design for a hamburger chain restaurant was eligible for 
protection because it was nonfunctional and had the secondary 
meaning of identifying the hamburger chain.147  
However, such justifications may be unavailable to the big-box 
retailer attempting to protect its facade. Unlike a Mexican-themed 
interior or a castle-like exterior, a plain exterior facade is unlikely to 
be inherently distinctive. Even if a big-box store’s exterior facade 
were inherently distinctive, its design would remain functional.148 The 
design helps to keep costs low and draw attention to the particular 
store.149 Moreover, given that many big-box stores use plain exterior 
facades with large signs, allowing one store to trademark that design 
would create a monopoly on that trade dress and preclude other 
stores from implementing cost-effective store designs. Consequently, 
the facade design would not be eligible for trademark registration.  
Further, a big-box retailer is unlikely to show a distinctive design 
through secondary meaning. Unlike the design of a white castle for a 
hamburger chain, a plain exterior facade has no clearly distinctive 
elements and does not signal the trademark of one particular store. 
Assuming, however, that a retailer developed a distinctive design 
based on secondary meaning, used a nonfunctional exterior facade 
design (such as yellow brick), and registered the design as a 
trademark, section 1121(b) would apply to any city restrictions on 
that exterior facade.  
Under the Second Circuit’s Lisa’s Party City approach, a city 
may use uniform aesthetic regulations to change portions of a 
trademark as long as the regulations do not impair all uses of that 
 
 146. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992). 
 147. See White Tower Sys., Inc. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 69 
(6th Cir. 1937) (upholding the district court’s finding of trademark infringement). 
 148. See Raphael Winick, Note, Copyright Protection for Architecture After the Architectural 
Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 41 DUKE L.J. 1598, 1635–39 (1992) (“Functionality is 
the most significant hurdle for trademark protection of architectural works.”). 
 149. MD. DEP’T OF PLANNING, supra note 5, at 44. 
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trademark.150 This trademarked exterior facade would be analyzed in 
the same way as a trademarked exterior color.151 A city could impose 
individual restrictions on the exterior facade because it would not 
impair all uses of the trademark within the jurisdiction.152 However, a 
municipal ordinance that restricted all uses of the trademarked facade 
would violate section 1121(b).153 
Under the Ninth Circuit’s Blockbuster approach, a city could 
prohibit use of the facade design but could not require changes to the 
design. A city could prohibit a store from using its trademarked plain 
exterior facade with trimmings and a large sign but could not require 
that store to use a plain exterior facade with no trimmings or require 
additional large granite pillars, because those features would change 
the trademark. 
Although it is unlikely that a big-box retailer could trademark an 
exterior facade because of its functionality, the retailer could pursue 
another option to protect its design. The Architectural Works 
Copyright Protection Act (ACWPA)154 extends copyright protection 
to completed architectural works if the structure qualifies as a 
“building,”155 consists of “original design elements,” and is not 
“functionally required.”156 A big-box retailer could attempt to 
copyright the architectural design of the building itself, and, in doing 
so, might also protect the design of the exterior facade.157 However, 
the architectural design of a big-box retail facility probably would not 
contain original design elements and the design would be functionally 
required to reduce costs and to promote an advertising message. 
 
 150. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
 154. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701–
706, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990) [hereinafter ACWPA] (codified at scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 155. The definition of “building” includes three-dimensional structures and includes 
nonhabitable structures such as “churches, pergolas, gazebos, and garden pavilions” but 
excludes “interstate highway bridges, cloverleafs, canals, dams, and pedestrian walkways.” 
Winick, supra note 148, at 1613–15. A big-box retail facility would fit the definition of a 
building. 
 156. Id. at 1616 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6949). 
 157. Under the ACWPA, the separable decorative elements of an architectural work may 
qualify for protection as a “sculptural work.” Winick, supra note 148, at 1619. Because the 
exterior facade is not a separable decorative element of a retail facility, it would not qualify for 
protection as a sculptural work. 
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More fundamentally, even if a big-box retailer did copyright its 
architectural design, the ACWPA explicitly allows state and local 
zoning regulations to preempt copyright protections.158 Therefore, the 
retailer would not be able to prevent local governments from 
restricting its architectural design; copyright protection would only 
protect the retailer from architectural design infringement. 
C. Summary of the Lanham Act and Its Application to Big-Box 
Retailers 
Although section 1121(b) of the Lanham Act provides one 
avenue for big-box retailers to protect their architectural design 
features from aesthetic municipal restrictions, most retailers are 
unlikely to succeed in challenges to such restrictions. Retailers may 
trademark only a limited number of features of the big-box retail-
facility design. A retailer can trademark neither the materials it uses 
on its building facade nor the building facade design.  
Even after trademarking a general color and an exterior color, a 
retailer will be able to protect these features only in limited 
circumstances. Under the Second Circuit’s approach, a retailer can 
mount a successful challenge if it trademarks a particular exterior 
color and a municipal ordinance restricts the use of that color on all 
stores within the municipality. For a retailer to successfully protect its 
color in the Ninth Circuit, the city must attempt to require a color 
different from the trademarked general or exterior color; however, 
the city can legitimately prohibit the store from using the 
trademarked color completely. Under all other circumstances, 
municipal aesthetic restrictions on big-box retail facilities will not 
violate section 1121(b) of the Lanham Act. 
IV.  THE DECLINE OF THE BIG-BOX TRADEMARK 
At the outset, the aesthetic design restriction is a seemingly 
perfect compromise in the battle between economic and aesthetic 
interests that communities face when considering the entrance of big-
box retailers. Yet, these aesthetic restrictions pose a problem for a 
retailer’s protected trade dress. As Justice Frankfurter cogently 
explained: 
The owner of a mark . . . [makes] every effort to impregnate the 
atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial 
 
 158. ACWPA § 705 (1978) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(4) (2000)). 
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symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same—to 
convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the 
desirability of the commodity upon which it appears.159 
In meeting community standards for architectural appearance, big-
box retailers may be unable to convey their “congenial symbol[s].” A 
Home Depot in South Carolina may have a dark brown exterior color 
with minimal orange trimmings while a Home Depot in North 
Carolina may have a stucco and cream exterior color with a huge 
bright orange sign. If a North Carolinian consumer visits South 
Carolina and does not recognize the store as a Home Depot, Home 
Depot has lost the “drawing power of a congenial symbol,” and the 
municipal restrictions have caused consumer confusion as to its 
trademark.160  
Congress enacted section 1121(b) to prevent this weakening of 
trademarks and to protect congenial symbols by prohibiting states 
and municipalities from requiring “alterations” to trademarks. Its 
impetus in passing the section was to prevent the situations in which 
states and municipalities would require complete alterations of 
trademarked subject matter—as had occurred in Century 21. Yet the 
legislative history confuses the aim of the law because at least some 
members of Congress believed that the statute was not intended to 
prevent uniform zoning requirements on such issues as “lettering” 
and “neon signs.”161  
Due in part to this confusion, the case law interpreting section 
1121(b) has, in essence, reverted to the Century 21 holding and 
effaced the potency of section 1121(b). The Second Circuit, by relying 
primarily upon the legislative history of section 1121(b) without first 
interpreting the plain meaning of “alteration,” 162 has mangled section 
1121(b) to prevent only those restrictions affecting all forms of the 
 
 159. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
 160. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text (describing the importance of brand 
identity to big-box retailers). 
 161. See supra notes 87–94 and accompanying text (explaining the legislative history of 
section 1121(b)). 
 162. In order to determine Congressional intent, a court must look to “the particular 
statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” K Mart 
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). The court must first interpret the language on 
the face of the statute based on the “assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language 
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 
U.S. 189, 194 (1985). 
MCCONNELL FINISHED.DOC 12/20/2004  3:29 PM 
1566 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1537 
trademark, thus allowing a multiplicity of restrictions on big-box 
trademarks within the same state. On the other hand, the Ninth 
Circuit’s Blockbuster opinion, though applying the more common 
definition of “alteration,” creates a convoluted result by allowing a 
municipality to replace a trademark completely instead of just 
displacing the trademark with color and font requirements. 163  
Thus, as discussed in Part III, even if a big-box retailer attempted 
to challenge such municipal restrictions, the current interpretations of 
section 1121(b) as related to sign regulations would, for the most part, 
affirm the municipal restrictions.164 The only exception to this general 
rule is in the Second Circuit, where a city cannot pass a municipal 
ordinance restricting a trademarked exterior color.165 Applying the 
current interpretations of section 1121(b) for sign regulations, then, 
may result in the eventual loss of the big-box retailer’s congenial 
symbol.  
When Congress enacted section 1121(b), it did not foresee the 
prevalence of aesthetic restrictions on trademarks as a cause of 
consumer confusion. Given the rapid growth of these restrictions, 
which now affect the entire design of a big-box retail store, the 
decline of the big-box trademark seems imminent and Congress 
should revisit section 1121(b) and define “alteration” in light of this 
new threat to trademark protections.  
CONCLUSION 
The modern trend of imposing aesthetic restrictions on big-box 
retail stores allows cities to reap the economic advantages of the big-
box retailers while protecting the aesthetic nature of their 
communities, and, thus far, big-box retailers have complied with these 
restrictions. Yet, as municipalities require varying restrictions on 
color and building facade design, the efficacy of the retailers’ 
trademarks for color and design may erode. On its face, section 
1121(b) of the Lanham Act seems to protect trademarks from 
municipal restrictions; however, due in part to the confusing 
legislative history of section 1121(b), the case law applying section 
1121(b) results in most municipal restrictions on big-box design being 
 
 163. See supra note 116 (explaining the inherent tension in the Blockbuster holding as that, 
while it prevents the displacement of trademarked properties, it allows cities to completely 
replace trademarked properties, such as color). 
 164. See supra Part III. 
 165. See supra Part III.A.2.  
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upheld even though these restrictions erode retailers’ trademarks. 
Thus, as these restrictions become more prevalent, Congress should 
revisit the definition of “alteration” in section 1121(b). 
